Abstract. In this paper, we focus on the core stability of vertex cover games, which arise from vertex cover problems on graphs. Based on duality theory of linear programming, we first prove that a balanced vertex cover game has the stable core if and only if every edge belongs to a maximum matching in the corresponding graph. We also show that for a totally balanced vertex cover game, the core largeness, extendability and exactness are all equivalent, which imply the core stability.
Introduction
A transferable cooperative game Γ = (N, γ) consists of a player set N = {1, 2, · · · , n} and a characteristic function γ : 2 N → R, where for each subset S ⊆ N of players, γ(S) represents the revenue or cost achieved by the players in S without assistance of other players. One of the scopes of cooperative game theory is to study how to distribute the total revenue or cost γ(N ) among the participants in a fair way. Different philosophies result in different solution concepts, e.g., the core, the Shapley value, the Nucleolus and the stable set. Von Neumann and Morgenstern [11] first introduce the concept of the stable set and claimed that it is very useful in the analysis of a lot of bargaining situations. However, it seems difficult to investigate the properties of the stable set because of the complexity of its definition. Moreover, Deng and Papadimitriou [4] pointed out that determining the existence of the stable set for a given cooperative game is not known to be computable, and it is still unsolved.
While the core and the stable set are different, Shapley [7] has shown that for convex games, the core is the unique stable set. This result motivated researchers to study the problem: when do the core and the stable set coincide, that is, when is the core stable? As far as the core stability for concrete cooperative game model is concerned, only a few results have been obtained. Solymosi and Raghavan [9] studied the core stability for assignment games, Bietenhader and Okamoto [1] studied it for minimum coloring games defined on perfect graphs, and Sun and Fang [12] studied it for simple flow games. In this paper, we focus on core stability of vertex cover games introduced by Deng, Ibaraki and Nagamochi [2], which arise from the cost allocation problems related to vertex covers on graphs. We show that a vertex cover game has the stable core if and only if every edge belongs to a maximum matching in the corresponding graph. We also consider the problems on the core largeness, the extendability and the exactness of the game, which are closely related to core stability. We prove that all the three properties are equivalent for vertex cover games defined on bipartite graphs, and also equivalent to that every matching is contained in a maximum matching. Finally, we conclude with extensions of above results to general covering games.
Definitions and Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, all the games concerned are cost game, that is, the characteristic function specifies the cost of every coalitions. Let Γ = (N, γ) be a cooperative game. A vector
The set of imputations is denoted by I(Γ ). The core is defined as:
and totally balanced, if every subgame (i.e., the game obtained by restricting the player set to a coalition and the characteristic function to the power set of that coalition) is balanced. The concept of stability is due to von Neumann and Morgenstern [11] . Given a game Γ = (N, γ) and x, y ∈ I(Γ ). We say that x dominates y if there is a coalition S such that x(S) ≥ γ(S) and ∀ i ∈ S, x i < y i . A set F ⊆ I(Γ ) is stable if any two imputations in F do not dominate each other and any imputation not in F can be dominated by an imputation in F . Since the core allocations do not dominate each other, the core is stable simply means that any imputation not in the core can be dominated by a core imputation. Formally, the core of a balanced game Γ is stable, if for every y ∈ I(Γ ) \ C(Γ ), there exists an x ∈ C(Γ ) and a nonempty coalition S ⊂ N such that x(S) = γ(S) and x i < y i for each i ∈ S. Now let us give the definition of a vertex cover game. Given an undirected graph G = (V, E) with vertex set V and edge set E, the corresponding vertex cover game Γ G = (E, γ) is defined by:
1. The player set is E = {e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e n }; 2. For each coalition S ⊆ E, γ(S) is the size of a minimum vertex cover in the edge induced subgraph G[S] = (V, S).
The vertex cover game falls into the scope of the class of combinatorial cooperative games studied in Deng, Ibaraki and Nagamochi [2] . With the technique of integer programming and duality theory of linear programming, Deng, Ibaraki
